Koblitz curves allow very efficient elliptic curve cryptography. The reason is that one can trade expensive point doublings to cheap Frobenius endomorphisms by representing the scalar as a τ -adic expansion. Typically elliptic curve cryptosystems, such as ECDSA, also require the scalar as an integer. This results in a need for conversions between integers and the τ -adic domain, which are costly and hinder the use of Koblitz curves on very constrained devices, such as RFID tags, wireless sensors, or certain applications of the Internet of things. We provide solutions to this problem by showing how complete cryptographic processes, such as ECDSA signing, can be completed in the τ -adic domain with very few resources. This allows outsourcing conversions to a more powerful party. We provide several algorithms for performing arithmetic operations in the τ -adic domain. In particular, we introduce a new representation allowing more efficient and secure computations compared to the algorithms available in the preliminary version of this work from CARDIS 2014. We also provide datapath extensions with different speed and side-channel resistance properties that require areas from less than one hundred to a few hundred gate equivalents on 0.13-µm CMOS. These extensions are applicable for all Koblitz curves.
an academic work on lightweight public-key cryptography tags see, e.g., [35] . One example of practical use cases of lightweight ECC is German identification documents and passports (see, e.g., [36] ). Several researchers have proposed implementations which aim to minimize area, power, and/or energy of computing elliptic curve scalar multiplications [4, 6, 17, 24, 26] which are the fundamental operations of all elliptic curve cryptosystem.
Koblitz curves [23] are a special class of elliptic curves which allow very efficient elliptic curve operations when scalars used in scalar multiplications are given as τ -adic expansions. Koblitz curves allow extremely fast scalar multiplications on both software [3, 13, 14, 16, 40, 42] and hardware [2, 5, 11, 12, 18, 27, 33] . A recent paper [4] showed that they can be implemented also with very few resources (especially, in terms of energy) if the scalars are already in the τ -adic domain. Many cryptosystems require both the integer and τ -adic representations of the scalar which results in a need for conversions between the domains. Most hardware implementations of the conversions [1, 9, 10, 19, 37] require a lot of resources making them infeasible for constrained devices. This has prevented from using Koblitz curves although they would otherwise result in very effi-cient lightweight implementations. The only exception is the converter recently presented in [38] . A workaround to the problem is to design a protocol that operates directly in the τ -adic domain [8] . However, this approach prevents from using standardized algorithms and protocols which, consequently, makes the design work more laborious and may even lead to cryptographic weaknesses in the worst case.
In this paper, we show how the computationally weaker party of a cryptosystem can delegate conversions to the more powerful party by computing all operations directly in the τ -adic domain with a small datapath extension for τ -adic arithmetic. The approach is applicable to Koblitz curve cryptosystems that require scalar multiplications and modular arithmetic with the scalar, e.g., elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA). This can be done without affecting the cryptographic strength of the cryptosystem. To summarize, we show how Koblitz curves can be used more efficiently in lightweight implementations.
A preliminary version [20] of this paper was published in CARDIS 2014. The novel contributions of this extended version are the following:
-We provide further details and more comprehensive analysis of the approach presented in [20] ; -We introduce a representation called partial τ -adic expansion which allows τ -adic arithmetic without expensive foldings and leads to faster and more secure implementations; -We explore how the circuitries for the algorithms can be unrolled in order to obtain speedups with only small increases in area requirements; -We propose algorithms which are protected against single-trace side-channel attacks such as timing attacks and simple power analysis; and -We present a lightweight implementation of an existing conversion algorithm from [10] . We compare τ -adic arithmetic to this implementation and the converter from [38] and show that τ -adic arithmetic has certain advantages and offers tradeoffs which are not available with conversion based approaches.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses Koblitz curves and ECDSA. Section 3 explores existing options to implement Koblitz curves in lightweight applications and introduces the idea of outsourcing conversions. An addition algorithm for the τ -adic domain is presented and analyzed in Sect. 4. Section 5 presents algorithms for other arithmetic operations. Section 6 introduces the partial τ -adic expansion and algorithms based on it. Section 7 presents datapath extensions for the algorithms from Sects. [4] [5] [6] . Lightweight implementations of existing conversion algorithms are described in Sect. 8 for fair comparisons. Section 9 presents results on 0.13-µm CMOS and compares them to the lightweight converters. Section 10 closes the paper with conclusions.
Koblitz curves and ECDSA
In the following, we discuss ECC and Koblitz curves and, then, present ECDSA signature generation as an example.
Elliptic curve cryptography and Koblitz curves
In the mid-1980s, Miller [29] and Koblitz [22] showed how public-key cryptography can be based on the difficulty of solving discrete logarithms in an additive Abelian group E formed by points on an elliptic curve. Let k ∈ Z + and P ∈ E. The main operation in ECC is scalar multiplication given by:
The operation Q + R, where Q, R ∈ E, is called point addition if Q = ±R and point doubling if Q = R. Scalar multiplication can be computed with a series of point doublings and point additions, e.g., by using the well-known double-and-add algorithm. Elliptic curves over G F (2 m ), finite fields of characteristic two, are often preferred in hardware implementations of ECC because of the efficient carry-less arithmetic. These curves are called binary curves.
Koblitz curves [23] are the following binary curves:
where a 2 ∈ {0, 1}, a 6 = 1, and x, y ∈ G F(2 m ). Let K denote the Abelian group of points (x, y) that satisfy (2) together with O, which is a special point that acts as the zero element of the group. Koblitz curves have the property that if a point P = (x, y) ∈ K, then also its Frobenius endomorphism
This allows devising efficient scalar multiplication algorithms where Frobenius endomorphisms are computed instead of point doublings. It can be shown that F(F(P)) − μF(P) + 2P = 0, where μ = (−1) 1−a 2 , holds for all P ∈ K [23] . Consequently, F(P) can be seen as a multiplication by the complex number τ that satisfies τ 2 − μτ + 2 = 0, which gives τ = (μ + √ −7)/2. If the scalar k is given using the base τ as a τ -adic expansion K = K i τ i , the scalar multiplication K P can be computed with a Frobenius-and-add algorithm, where Frobenius endomorphisms are computed for each K i and point additions (or subtractions) are computed for K i = 0. This is similar to the double-and-add algorithm except that computationally expensive point doublings are replaced with cheap Frobenius endomorphisms. Hence, if a τ -adic expansion can be efficiently found, then Koblitz curves offer significant efficiency improvements compared to general binary curves.
We use the following notation. 
ECDSA signature generation
An ECDSA signature (r , s) for a message M is computed as follows [32] :
where q is the order of P, d is the signer's private key, [kP] x is the x-coordinate of kP, and H (M) is the hash of M. Equation (4) is efficiently computed using Koblitz curves if k is given as a τ -adic expansion; i.e., we compute r = [K P] x . In this paper, we assume that the coefficients of K take values K i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, e.g., K can be represented with the τ -adic nonadjacent form (τ NAF) [39] or the τ -adic zero-free representation (τ ZFR) [34, 41] . The τ NAF gives improvements in computation latency and the τ ZFR offers protection against side-channel attacks. Both of them can be encoded with m bits by using the encoding proposed by Joye and Tymen [21] or by storing only the signs of the coefficients, respectively. In addition to the scalar multiplication, the signing requires modular integer arithmetic in (6) . Hence, we need both the integer k and the τ -adic expansion K .
We can avoid the expensive inversion of (6) by transmitting the numerator and denominator separately after blinding them with b
We use this technique for efficiency reasons, but the proposed idea and techniques apply also without it. Although we focus on ECDSA, the proposed idea and algorithms apply also to other Koblitz curve cryptosystems, e.g., Schnorr signatures.
Koblitz curves in lightweight applications
Lightweight applications are typically asymmetric in the sense that one of the communicating parties is strictly lim-
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(c) Fig. 1 Three options for using Koblitz curves in a wireless tag. Thin black and thick gray arrows represent integer and τ -adic values, respectively. a The random number generator (RNG) generates an integer k which is converted to a τ -adic expansion K for the elliptic curve scalar multiplication (ECSM) and k is used for the arithmetic part; b the RNG generates a random K for the ECSM which is converted to k for the arithmetic part; and c the RNG generates a random K but the arithmetic part is also performed (at least partly) in the τ -adic domain. The conversion is delegated to the more powerful server. In addition to k (or K ), the RNG is used also for obtaining other random variables in the cryptosystem ited in resources whereas the other is not. As an example, we consider an application where a wireless tag communicates with a server over a radio channel. The tag is limited in computational resources, power, and energy, but the server has plenty of resources for computations. The tag implements a Koblitz curve cryptosystem which requires both elliptic curve operations and modular arithmetic with integers. This section explores solutions for implementing lightweight Koblitz curve cryptosystems that require both scalar multiplications and arithmetic with the scalar. We survey two existing options for computing ECDSA signatures on Koblitz curves in Sect. 3.1 as well as the new idea for delegating conversions from the tag to the server in Sect. 3.2.
Solutions based on conversions
The first option, which is depicted in Fig. 1a , is to generate k as a random integer and convert it into a τ -adic expansion K for scalar multiplication (4). Equation (6) or (8) can be computed using the original integer k. The first method for conversion was given by Koblitz [23] . It has the drawback that τ -adic expansions are twice as long as the original scalars. Later, Meier and Staffelbach [28] and Solinas [39] showed that expansions of approximately the same length as the original scalar can be found. Solinas [39] also introduced τ NAF and windowed τ NAF (w-τ NAF) representations. These conversions require, e.g., operations with large rational numbers which render them very inefficient for hardware implementations. The first hardware-oriented conversion algorithm and implementation were presented by Järvinen et al. [19] . Brumley and Järvinen [10] later presented an algorithm requiring only integer additions, and it has been used as the basis of all state-of-the-art converters. However, if their algorithm is implemented in a straigthforward manner, it becomes too large for very constrained devices mostly because it uses long adders and a large number of registers. Their work was extended by Adikari et al. [1] and Sinha Roy et al. [37] who focused on improving speed at the expense of resource requirements, which makes them even less suitable for constrained devices. The first lightweight conversion algorithm and implementation were recently proposed by Sinha Roy et al. [38] . We compare our results to this work later in Sect. 9.
The second option, which is shown in Fig. 1b , is to generate the scalar as a random τ -adic expansion K and to find its integer equivalent for computing (6) or (8) . Generating random τ -adic expansions was first mentioned (and credited to Lenstra) by Koblitz [23] , but he did not provide a method for finding the integer equivalent of the scalar. The first method for retrieving the integer equivalent k was proposed by Lange in [25] . Her method requires several multiplications with long operands. More efficient methods were later introduced by Brumley and Järvinen in [9, 10] . We design our own lightweight implementation of the algorithm from [9, 10] in Sect. 8 and use it for comparisons in Sect. 9.
Solution for outsourcing conversions
A third option, which is shown in Fig. 1c , was introduced in the preliminary version of this paper that was presented in CARDIS 2014 [20] . Similarly to the second option, the tag generates a random τ -adic expansion K and uses it for scalar multiplication (4). However, the tag does not compute the integer equivalent k but, instead, uses K directly and computes (6) or (8) in the τ -adic domain. The results of these operations (τ -adic expansions) are transmitted over the radio channel to the server which first converts the results to integers and then proceeds with normal server-side operations. The values that do not depend on the scalar, i.e., (7) , should be computed with modular integer arithmetic because it is cheaper. Scalar multiplication is still computed entirely using binary field arithmetic, and it does not require any modifications because of the use of τ -adic arithmetic for processing the scalar k. Clearly, this option improves efficiency of the tag only if operations in the τ -adic domain are cheaper than conversions. In the following, we show that they can, indeed, be implemented with very few resources.
From security perspective, the third option is equivalent with the second option (see, e.g., [25] ) because transmitting τ -adic expansions instead of their integer equivalents does not reveal any additional information about the secret scalars.
The idea has similarities with [8] where a modified version of the Girault-Poupard-Stern identification scheme was built on τ -adic expansions. Both [8] and the new idea use arithmetic in the τ -adic domain. We adapt and further develop the addition algorithm from [8] . The new idea allows delegating conversions to the more powerful party for arbitrary Koblitz curve cryptosystems requiring scalar multiplications and modular integer arithmetic with the scalar, whereas [8] presented a single identification scheme built around τ -adic expansions only. For instance, it is unclear how to build a digital signature scheme that uses only τ -adic expansions because the ideas of [8] cannot be directly generalized to other schemes. We also provide the first hardware realizations of algorithms required for τ -adic arithmetic. These implementations may have importance also for implementing the scheme from [8] .
The rest of the paper focuses primarily on efficient computation of (8): b × K , where b is an integer and K is a τ -adic expansion. This allows computing ECDSA signatures in low-resource tags as shown above. Also algorithms for implementing other arithmetic operations in the τ -adic domain are provided for completeness. This allows using the new idea for a variety of Koblitz curve cryptosystems.
Addition in the τ -adic domain
The cornerstone of the idea discussed in Sect. 3.2 is to devise an efficient algorithm for adding two τ -adic expansions. In this section, we show how to construct such an algorithm. Our addition algorithm has similarities with the algorithm from [8] which also computes additions of τ -adic expansions. Our algorithm is more efficient because it avoids unnecessary steps and uses simpler methods for deriving C i , t 0 , and t 1 . We also provide a deeper analysis of the algorithm. Other arithmetic operations can be built upon the addition algorithm and they are discussed later in Sect. 5.
Let A and B be the τ -adic expansions of two positive integers a and b such that
where A i ∈ {0, 1} and
τ NAF or τ ZFR) and (b) this allows computing subtractions with the same algorithm.
Coefficient-wise addition of the two expansions gives:
where
. This expansion is correct in the sense that C a + b but the set of digit values has grown. Hence, the expansion must be processed in order to obtain a binary τ -adic expansion. Instead of allowing C to have signed binary values as in [8] , we limit the set of digits to C i ∈ {0, 1} in order to simplify computations and decrease the storage requirements for C. This does not imply restrictions for the use of the addition algorithm in our case as long as B i are allowed to have signed binary values because we do not use the results of additions for computing scalar multiplications.
The binary τ -adic expansion C can be found analogously to normal addition of binary numbers by using a carry [8] . The main difference is that the carry is a τ -adic number t. A coefficient C i ∈ {0, 1} is obtained by adding the coefficients A i and B i with the carry from the previous iteration and by reducing this value modulo 2; i.e., by taking the least significant bit (lsb). Every τ -adic number and, hence, also t can be represented as t 0 +t 1 τ where t 0 , t 1 ∈ Z [39] . Updating the carry for the next iteration requires a division by τ . As shown by Solinas [39] , t 0 +t 1 τ is divisible by τ if and only if t 0 is even. Subtracting C i (equivalent with the rounding toward the nearest smaller integer after division by two) ensures this and, hence, we get:
We continue the above process for all n bits and until (t 0 , t 1 ) = (0, 0). The resulting algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
Remark 1 Computing subtractions with Algorithm 1 is straightforward:
I.e., we flip the signs of B i and compute an addition with Algorithm 1.
Analysis of Algorithm 1
There are certain aspects that must be analyzed before Algorithm 1 is ready for efficient hardware implementation. The most crucial one is the size of the carry (t 0 , t 1 ) because efficient hardware implementation is impossible without knowing the number of flip-flops required for it. The ending condition of Algorithm 1 also implies that the latency of an addition depends on the values of the operands. This might open vulnerabilities against timing attacks. The following analysis sheds light on these aspects and provides efficient solutions for them. In order to analyze Algorithm 1, we model it as a finite state machine (FSM) so that the carry (t 0 , t 1 ) represents the state. Algorithm 1 can find unsigned binary τ -adic expansions with any A i , B i ∈ Z but, in this analysis and in the following propositions, we limit them so that A i ∈ {0, 1} and B i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, as described above. The FSM is constructed starting from the state (t 0 , t 1 ) = (0, 0) by analyzing all transitions with all possible inputs A i +B i ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}. E.g., when μ = 1, we find out that the possible next states from the initial state (0, 0) are (0, 0) with inputs 0 and 1 (the corresponding outputs are then 0 and 1), (−1, 1) with input −1 (output 1), and (1, −1) with input 2 (output 0). Next, we analyze (−1, 1) or (1, −1), and so on. The process is continued as long as there are states that have not been analyzed. The resulting FSM for μ = 1 is depicted in Fig. 2 and it contains 21 states. We draw two major conclusions from this FSM (and the corresponding one for μ = −1 which is omitted for brevity).
Proposition 1
For both μ = ±1, the carry (t 0 , t 1 ) can be represented with 6 bits so that both t 0 and t 1 require 3 bits.
Proof The FSM of Fig. 2 shows that −3 ≤ t 0 ≤ 3 and −2 ≤ t 1 ≤ 2. There are 7 distinct values for t 0 and 5 for t 1 , and hence, both require 3 bits. The FSM for μ = −1 can be constructed similarly, and it also contains 21 states so that −3 ≤ t 0 ≤ 3 and −2 ≤ t 1 ≤ 2. Hence, t 0 and t 1 both require 3 bits for μ = ±1. Consequently, the carry requires 6 bits. Proof After all n bits of A and B have been processed, the FSM can be in any of the 21 states. Hence, the constant λ is given by the longest path from any state to the state (0, 0) when the input is fixed to zero; i.e., A i = B i = 0. The FSM of Fig. 2 shows that the longest path starts from the state (0, 2) and goes through the following states (2, 0),
, and (1, 0) to (0, 0) and outputs (0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 0, 1). Thus, λ = 7 for μ = 1. It can be shown similarly that λ = 7 also for μ = −1.
Other τ -adic operations
In this section, we describe algorithms for other arithmetic operations in the τ -adic domain. These algorithms use the addition algorithm given in Algorithm 1.
Folding
The length of an arbitrarily long τ -adic expansion can be reduced to about m bits without changing its integer equivalent modulo q. The integer equivalent of a τ -adic expansion 
where A i = 0 for i ≥ n. As a result of (13), an expansion can be compressed to approximately m bits by "folding" the expansion; i.e., folding is analogous to modular reduction. Let An algorithm for folding (including the optional trimming in the end) is given in Algorithm 2. Typically, the optional trimming requires at most one addition, B (0) + B (1) , often it is not needed at all.
By Proposition 2, if a folding is computed after every addition, then it becomes A (0) + A (1) with an m-bit A (0) and an at most 7-bit A (1) . While in theory this addition can give a result which is longer than m bits, the result is at most m bits long with an extremely high probability. In fact, the folding can be ended as soon as all bits of A (1) have been processed and t = (0, 0) because, after this, all bits of the result will be the same as in A (0) . We performed experiments on the practical lengths of folding computations. We computed C = A + B where A is a random binary τ -adic expansion (A i ∈ {0, 1}) and B is either (a) a random binary τ -adic expansion (B i ∈ {0, 1}), The results show that the average cost of computing a folding is low if it is computed after each addition. However, if (somewhat) constant time foldings are needed, a high number of iterations (e.g., 64 or more) needs to be computed making folding a relatively costly operation. In Sect. 6, we show that foldings can be avoided completely by using a special representation called partial τ -adic representation.
Multiplication
Two τ -adic expansions A and B are multiplied as follows:
An algorithm for computing (14) can be devised by using a variation of the binary method. It was also proposed in [8] that multiplications of two τ -adic expansions can be done by adopting the binary method (possibly combined with the Karatsuba approach). In Algorithm 3, an addition is computed with Algorithm 1 if A i = 1 and a multiplication by τ is performed for all A i by shifting the bit vector. Hence, multiplication requires n − 1 shifts and ρ(A) additions, where To keep the result and intermediate values close to m bits, foldings should be computed during the algorithms. As shown in Sect. 5.1, the average cost varies, depending on the types of the operands, from 2.56 to 4.21 iterations per addition if each addition is followed by a folding.
Remark 3 Algorithm 4 also serves as an algorithm for converting integers to the τ -adic domain. An integer a can be converted by computing a × 1 with Algorithm 4. The algorithm returns C = A, the unsigned binary τ -adic expansion of a.
Remark 4 Different versions of the binary method (e.g., NAF or window) can be straightforwardly used for multiplications of τ -adic expansions (also when the other operand is an integer). Especially, using Montgomery's ladder [30] provides a constant sequence of operations (shifts and additions), which improves resistance against side-channel analysis. The scalar k is typically a nonce, and the adversary is limited to a single side-channel trace. Thus, constant sequence of operations offers sufficient protection against most attacks. These issues are further explored in Sects. 6 and 7.3.
Multiplicative inverse
The multiplicative inverse modulo q, a −1 , for an integer a can be found via Fermat's Little Theorem:
This exponentiation gives a straightforward way to compute inversions also with τ -adic expansions. Let
can be found by computing:
Algorithm 5 computes (16) by using Algorithm 3. Partial τ -adic expansions are powerful because they allow computations without foldings. To achieve this, we devise a version of Algorithm 1 that takes and returns partial τ -adic expansions instead of τ -adic expansions. The difference between regular τ -adic additions with Algorithm 1 and the additions of partial τ -adic expansions is highlighted by denoting the latter by .
Algorithm 6 gives an algorithm for computing a partial τ -adic expansion (C, γ ) with binary C i when given two partial τ -adic expansions (A, α) and (B, β) . Instead of initializing the algorithm with (0, 0) as in Algorithm 1, we now initialize 
Algorithm 6: Addition of partial τ -adic expansions it with α +β in order to take the remainder parts into account. After this, the expansion part is computed similarly as in Algorithm 1. Indeed, if one runs the algorithm until t = (0, 0), then one obtains C a + b. However, we run the algorithm only for m iterations and obtain (C, γ ), where C is exactly m bits long and γ represents "the tail" which could be up to seven bits long (see Proposition 2). The carry (t 0 , t 1 ) can be directly used as γ because
Because C is always m bits long, an arbitrary number of additions can be computed without foldings. However, we do not yet know whether the remainder part is reasonably bounded. The following proposition sheds light on this issue. Let S 0 denote the 21 states that can be reached in Algorithm 1; i.e., the states depicted in Fig. 2 for μ = 1. Proof In Line 1 of Algorithm 6, t is initialized with (α 0 + β 0 , α 1 + β 1 ) which can yield t / ∈ S 0 . There are in total 69 possible states for t after Line 1 for both μ = ±1. We denote these states by S 1 . We analyze all states S 1 \S 0 separately. We compute all next states with all possible inputs A i + B i ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2} for as many iterations as is required until t can contain only states in S 0 . Figure 4 shows an example of how this analysis proceeds for t = (−3, 3) when μ = 1. Depending on A i and B i , t can have two values after iteration i = 0: (1, 2) or (2, 1), neither of which is in S 0 . After iteration i = 1, the algorithm is in one of five possible states, of which only (3, −2) / ∈ S 0 . This state results in either (−1, −1) or (0, −2), both states in S 0 , after the next iteration (i = 2). Hence, Algorithm 6 is guaranteed to be in S 0 after three iterations if it is initialized with α + β = (−3, 3) . Performing similar analysis for all S 1 \S 0 shows that, with all possible initializations from S 1 , it takes at most seven iterations (after i = 6) before Algorithm 6 is in a state in S 0 . Because Algorithm 6 runs for exactly m iterations, it is guaranteed to return γ ∈ S 0 if m > 6.
Proposition 3 Let (A, α) and (B, β) be two partial τ -adic expansions such that
To summarize, Algorithm 6 was shown to return bounded remainder parts for all practically relevant m. Hence, Algo- A m+1 ) ). Algorithm 7 shows a variation of Algorithm 4 for partial τ -adic expansions. The algorithm allows B with B i ∈ {0, ±1} which are m + 2 bits long by using the trick explained above and, hence, it can be used for τ NAF expansions with length m + a with a ∈ {0, 1} that are commonly used in Koblitz curve cryptosystems. Line 2 of Algorithm 7 stores B into the accumulator C after which the multiplication is carried out via the double-and-add approach of Algorithm 4. In Line 7, a zero is added to C in order to embed the potentially nonzero γ and to obtain the m-bit binary τ -adic expansion. The probability that this addition outputs γ = (0, 0) is negligible. If this nonetheless happens, then Line 7 can be repeated.
Algorithm 8 presents a variation of multiplication by integer that uses Montgomery's ladder with a constant sequence of operations. The beginning and ending of the algorithm are similar to Algorithm 7. The main loop computes an addition of the two accumulator values (C, γ ) and (D, δ) followed by an addition where one of the accumulators is added to itself. Hence, regardless of the value of a i two similar additions are computed on each iteration and the algorithm offers good protection against side-channel attacks.
The execution time of Algorithm 8 depends on log 2 a . This can be avoided, e.g., by adding multiples of q to a so that Comparing Algorithms 7 and 8 reveals that there is a price to pay for constant time and operation sequence. First, Algorithm 7 requires log 2 a +ρ(a)+1 ≈ 3 2 log 2 a applications of Algorithm 6, whereas Algorithm 8 requires exactly 2 log 2 a +3, which is a roughly 33 % increase in the number of additions. Second, Algorithm 8 requires two accumulators, (C, γ ) and (D, δ), whereas Algorithm 7 uses only one accumulator (C, γ ) .
A multiplication by τ is a simple shift in Algorithm 3. Multiplying a partial τ -adic expansion (A, α) by τ is more complicated because τ α = α 0 τ + ατ 2 which cannot be used as the remainder part of the result. There are several ways to perform this multiplication. Multiplication of two partial τ -adic expansions can be computed by first embedding the remainder part of (A, α) by  computing (A, α) (0, (0, 0) ) and, then, using Algorithm 3 where shifts are replaced by the above procedure and C + B with (C, γ ) (B, β) . If a protocol requires scalar multiplications with scalars that are given as partial τ -adic expansions, then the remainder part α should be embedded in order to avoid the problems of dealing with remainder parts in scalar multiplications. I.e., instead of computing (K , κ)P, we first compute (K , κ ) ← (K , κ) (0, (0, 0) ) so that κ = (0, 0) and then compute K P in a normal way.
Architecture
The objective of this work was to provide a small circuitry that could be used as a datapath extension in an arithmetic logic unit (ALU) to compute τ -adic arithmetic in lightweight implementations. Figure 5 presents datapath extensions for computing Algorithms 1 and 6 for μ = 1. Because B i ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, they can be used for K with signed-bit representations (e.g., τ NAF or τ ZFR). The datapath extensions are designed to be added into the datapath of an ALU that supports other operations required by the cryptosystem (arithmetic in G F(2 m ), arithmetic modulo q, etc.).
The architectures of Fig. 5 consist of registers for storing the carry (t 0 , t 1 ) and adders for computing Lines 3-5 of Algorithms 1 and 6. Proposition 1 tells that both t 0 and t 1 require three bits in Algorithm 1 and, hence, Fig. 5a contains six flipflops. Because (t 0 , t 1 ) = α + β gives −6 ≤ t 0 ≤ 6 and −4 ≤ t 1 ≤ 4, they both require 4-bit registers; hence, Fig. 5b contains eight flip-flops. These registers must be such that they can be initialized to a specific value in order to write the values γ 0 = α 0 +β 0 and γ 1 = α 1 +β 1 in them. Adders for these additions are not included in the datapath extension because it is assumed that they are available in the ALU in order to compute modular arithmetic (e.g., (7)). In Fig. 5a , r is a 4-bit value because −3 ≤ t 0 ≤ 3 and −1 ≤ A i + B i ≤ 2. A 5-bit r is computed in Fig. 5b because −6 ≤ t 0 ≤ 6. For the same reason, additional adders are required also for updating (t 0 , t 1 ). The adders on the bottom-left compute t 1 + r /2 and the adders on the bottom-right compute the negation: − r /2 .
Datapath extensions for μ = −1 can be devised similarly, but we omit the description for brevity. We merely state that they are similar to the ones for μ = 1: the only difference is that the adders updating t 0 (bottom-left in Fig. 5 ) use the outputs of the negation circuitry that computes − r /2 (bottom-right in Fig. 5 ) instead of taking r /2 directly. Hence, the area requirements should, in theory, remain the same but the critical path becomes longer.
Unrolled architectures
When ω iterations of the for loops of Algorithms 1 and 6 are unrolled, the logic for computing the values is replicated ω times but only a single set of registers for storing the carry
is needed in the end. Because these registers consume a significant portion of the area, unrolling gives major improvements in latency-area ratio. Unrolling Algorithm 1 is straightforward. One simply replicates the logic ω times which reduces the number of iterations to (m + λ)/ω (as per Proposition 2). Even if m + λ is not a multiple of the unrolling factor ω, it suffices to pad the inputs with zeros to make the number of iterations a multiple of ω. I.e., one finds the smallest λ such that λ ≥ λ = 7 and ω | m + λ .
Unrolling Algorithm 6 is more complicated because it must run for exactly m iterations. Because m is a prime, ω m (with the exception of ω = m) and the unrolled architecture must include a multiplexer for selecting values to be stored into the registers. The outputs of the unrolled iteration m mod ω are selected for the last iteration of the unrolled algorithm in order to store the results of the iteration m. The outputs of the last unrolled iteration are used for all other iterations.
It is possible to simplify the unrolled iterations when Fig. 5b is unrolled. Proposition 3 tells that if ω ≥ 6, then the circuitry of Fig. 5a can be used instead of Fig. 5b for the last replications of combinational parts. Already earlier replications can be optimized because the sets of possible values of t 0 and t 1 get smaller.
High-level architecture and latencies
In most practical cases, the datapath extension would be added to a W -bit ALU connected to a RAM which stores W -bit words. In addition to the datapath extension, Algorithms 1 and 6 require also three W -bit shift registers, two for the operands A and B and one for the result C.
We consider both single-port and dual-port RAMs. In the case of a single-port RAM, reading and storing words of the operands to the shift registers require two clock cycles. For a dual-port RAM, this can be done in a single clock cycle. An unrolled datapath extension computes ω bits of the result in one clock cycle. A natural upper bound for ω is W , and to facilitate efficient implementation one should ensure ω | W . In that case, two W -bit words are added in W /ω clock cycles. The result word is written into the RAM in one clock cycle regardless of the type of the RAM. Hence, computing one word of an addition takes W /ω + h clock cycles, where h = 2 or h = 3 for single-port and dual-port RAM, respectively. We assume that computing and storing (t 0 , t 1 ) = (α 0 + β 0 , α 1 + β 1 ) and writing (t 0 , t 1 ) to the RAM take h and one clock cycles, respectively.
Assuming n = m, the above procedure executes Algo- Table 1 shows the latencies of computing Algorithms 7 and 8 with different unrolling factors and types of RAM for three curves from [32] : NIST K-163, K-233, and K-283. 
Side-channel attacks
Because the circuitry for τ -adic arithmetic processes secret values (at least K ), it must be protected against side-channel attacks. We focus on side-channel properties of computing b × K for ECDSA signature. Both b and K are secret values, and the cryptosystem is broken if an adversary learns either of them. Both values are also nonces meaning that they take new values for every signature generation. Hence, protection is required only against single-trace attacks (e.g., simple power analysis). In the following, we provide an algorithm level study on the side-channel properties of the proposed algorithms. Algorithm 4 scans the bits of b and utilizes the double-andadd scheme, which has a sequence of operations that depends on b. (C + C is computed for all b i and C + B is computed if b i = 1.) If C + C and C + B are computed as atomic operations which are indistinguishable to an adversary, then the adversary learns only the Hamming weight of b. However, if the adversary is able to distinguish these operations, then b is leaked. Algorithm 1 can be considered atomic because it always runs for m + λ similar iterations. However, foldings are required to trim the length of C to m in the course of Algorithm 4. As discussed in Sect. 5.1, the simplest option is to compute a folding after each addition. This folding can be computed either for a fixed number of iterations (e.g., m or 64) or for only as many iterations that are required. The former comes with a significant performance penalty, and the latter results in nonconstant execution times. For the latter, Fig. 3 reveals that the length of the folding after C + B differs from the folding after C + C. This leakage can be enough to learn information on b. Even for Montgomery's ladder, the lengths of foldings may give information about the values of the operands and leak security critical information. Hence, the algorithms that use τ -adic expansions and foldings are potentially insecure against side-channel adversaries or, alternatively, slow if one uses constant time foldings.
Partial τ -adic expansions offer constant time additions because foldings are not required. Even Algorithm 7 offers some security because C C and C B are atomic operations. Hence, only the Hamming weight of b leaks through the timing side-channel. Difficulties may still arise from control logic implementing Algorithm 7 (see Sect. 7.2). When the W -bit words of b are scanned by the control logic, the pattern of reading the words from the memory may reveal their Hamming weights. The adversary can learn the value of b from this information. This leakage can be avoided by using dummy reads from the memory after each bit of b.
Algorithm 8 provides a constant sequence of atomic operations and offers high protection against single-trace side-channel and safe error fault attacks because it prevents the attacker from learning b and K from the pattern of operations and does not involve dummy operations. Certain recent single-trace attacks (such as horizontal collision correlation attacks [7, 15] ) break scalar multiplications with constant patterns of operations. In principle, Algorithm 8 can be vulnerable against such attacks. However, mounting these single-trace attacks successfully against Algorithm 8 can be expected to be significantly more difficult than attacking scalar multiplications because the source of leakage is much smaller ( (m/ω) additions of ω-bit τ -adic expansions instead of m/W 2 multiplications of W -bit integers). Nevertheless, these attacks and countermeasures against them deserve further research in the future.
Because Algorithms 7 and 8 are both faster and more secure than Algorithm 4 (and its variant using Montgomery's ladder), we focus mainly on them in Sect. 9.
Discussion on lightweight conversions
Most of the existing hardware converters are targeted for high-speed applications and implemented on FPGAs. This makes fair comparisons with them very difficult. However, to show the areas of these converters and to highlight their unsuitability for lightweight applications, we have collected certain FPGA-based converters in Table 2 . This table presents the smallest converters available in these publications. To put these numbers into perspective with the results later given in Table 3 , one should remember, e.g., that one register is about 5.5 GE and one slice includes four registers. The only comparable converter is the recently proposed converter [38] from the authors of this paper. It finds the τ ZFR for an integer k by using a datapath extension for a 16-bit ALU. It was designed specifically for NIST K-283 curve, and it computes a conversion in 78,000 clock cycles. It is protected from side-channel attacks similarly to our new algorithms.
High-speed converters [10] hint that the conversion to the other direction, from a τ -adic expansion to an integer, could result in a more compact converter. In Sect. 8.1, we provide the first lightweight converter using this conversion. We use similar design decisions with the converter of [38] and the datapath extensions presented in Sect. 7 to allow fair comparisons.
on the loop index and the τ -adic bit. In Line 3, a subtraction of one from 2d 1 results in a borrow propagation, whereas an addition of one to 2d 1 involves no carry propagation. This difference may be detected using simple power analysis and could potentially leak information about the τ -adic representation.
Computing Algorithm 9 requires 121,000 clock cycles and a modular multiplication a × b mod q takes 73,000 clock cycles.
Remark 5
The options of Fig. 1b, c can be combined. We select a random K and execute Lines 1-4 of Algorithm 9. Instead of computing Line 5, we use the idea from [31] and compute s d = bK = bd 0 + bd 1 τ . Then, we send bd 0 and bd 1 to the server who computes the integer equivalent. This reduces the latency of the option of Fig. 1b but requires more communication.
Results and discussion
We described the circuitries of Fig. 5 and the corresponding ones for μ = −1 in VHDL. We synthesized the code with Synopsys Design Compiler D-2010.03-SP4 and Faraday FSC0L standard cell libraries for UMC 0.13-µm CMOS by using the 'compile ultra' process without additional constraints. We performed simulations with ModelSim SE 6.6d. Table 3 shows the areas of the datapath extensions for Algorithms 1 and 6 for both μ = ±1. Because partial τ -adic expansions offer both faster and more secure implementations, we provided the unrolled datapath extension only for Algorithm 6. The areas for Algorithm 1 were 75.25 and 76.25 gate equivalents (GE) for μ = 1 and μ = −1, respectively. The corresponding areas of Algorithm 6 are 128.00 and 114.75 GE so there is a price to pay for the lower latency and resistance against side-channel attacks. However, even these areas are small enough to be embedded into the datapath of a lightweight ALU. For instance, the ALU used in [38] had an area of about 4,323 GE in the same ASIC process and it includes the logic needed for the conversion. A datapath extension with ω = 4 would, hence, represent only about 6 % of this area and the overhead would be even smaller because the converter logic used in [38] could be removed. Tables 1  and 3 show that unrolling provides significant improvements in latency at a relatively low increase in area requirements.
Latencies of ECDSA signature generation
To compare with the converters from Sect. 8, we consider computation of b × K that is required by the ECDSA signature generation. For NIST K-283 and a 16-bit single-port RAM, Algorithms 7 and 8 compute it with latencies ranging from 41,568 to 205,597 clock cycles as shown in Table 1 . The Conv. and mult. denote the number of clock cycles for computing the conversions (to either direction) and multiplications with integers or partial τ -adic expansions converters from [38] and Sect. 8.1 compute the conversions in 78,000 and 121,000 clock cycles, respectively. However, a modular multiplication bk mod q is also required and it takes about 73,000 clock cycles. This gives total latencies of about 151,000 and 194,000 clock cycles, respectively. Both converters also require datapath extensions similarly to the new algorithms, and they cannot be computed as efficiently with standard ALUs. Hence, the proposed techniques are faster and improve upon solutions based on conversions when the unrolling factor ω ≥ 2. The above comparison is collected in Table 4 .
Power and energy
Power and energy consumption are essential characteristics for lightweight implementations. In the case of τ -adic arithmetic, they depend strongly on the ALU, which uses the datapath extensions, as well as on the type of memory, etc. Hence, in order to give exact numbers, we would need to implement an entire ECC ALU and even in that case the numbers would represent only the design choices taken in designing that specific ALU. This prevents us from giving accurate numbers, but we discuss these issues and provide rough estimates of the effects of τ -adic arithmetic on power and energy consumption in the following. For this analysis, we assume that power consumption is proportional to the area of the active part of the circuit. Consider, for instance, the ALU of [38] which computes conversions and modular integer multiplications with a 16-bit adder/subtractor but uses a 16-bit binary multiplier for scalar multiplications. Then, the power consumption of the conversion P c is dominated by the adder/subtractor and the power consumption of the scalar multiplication P s is determined mostly by the multiplier. The power of τ -adic arithmetic P τ is dominated by the datapath extension. Hence, we assume P c ∼ A c = 138.25 GE, 1 P m ∼ A m = 856.5 GE 1 , and P τ ∼ A τ = 114.75-792.75 GE, where A c , A m , and A τ are the areas of a 16-bit adder/subtractor, a 16-bit binary multiplier, and the datapath extension (see Table 3 ), respectively. This shows that τ -adic arithmetic uses less power than conversions (P τ < P c ) only if ω = 1. However, peak power is usually more important than average power for lightweight applications (e.g., passive RFID tags). Hence, the power consumptions of τ -adic arithmetic and conversions are less important in practice because both P τ < P m and P c < P m and scalar multiplication determine the peak power consumption.
If a device is battery-powered, then energy consumption is more important than power consumption. Estimates for energy consumptions are obtained by multiplying the above areas with the latencies from Table 4 . They show that τ -adic arithmetic reduces energy consumption compared to the option of Fig. 1b if ω < 8. The energy consumption of τ -adic arithmetic is on the same level (or only slightly higher) than that of the option of Fig. 1a for ω < 8. Therefore, τ -adic arithmetic offers lower latencies without using (significantly) more energy. However, it is clear that scalar multiplication will dominate also energy consumption because it has both significantly longer latency and larger average power consumption.
Conclusions
We provided a comprehensive set of algorithms and hardware architectures for arithmetic with τ -adic expansions. They allow delegating conversions from a constrained device (e.g., an RFID tag or a sensor node) to a more powerful party (e.g., a server). In particular, we showed that, e.g., ECDSA signatures can be computed with low latency and without leaking the secrets through side-channels by using partial τ -adic expansions and unrolled datapath extensions.
We showed that τ -adic arithmetic improves over previous options for implementing Koblitz curve cryptography in lightweight applications. It allows both faster operations and lower power consumption (with different choices for ω) with similar energy consumption levels compared to previous options based on conversions. Hence, τ -adic arithmetic opens up possibilities for tradeoffs that are not available by using conversions.
We also showed that Koblitz curves are feasible for lightweight applications even when modular integer arithmetic is required. All that is needed are small datapath extensions for implementing either τ -adic arithmetic or conversions. The use of Koblitz curves and our techniques
